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INTEROCEPTIVE SIMULATION  2 
Abstract 
Studies of the classic exteroceptive sensory systems (e.g., vision, touch) consistently demonstrate that 
vividly imagining a sensory experience of the world – simulating it – is associated with increased 
activity in the corresponding primary sensory cortex. We hypothesized, analogously, that simulating 
internal bodily sensations would be associated with increased neural activity in primary interoceptive 
cortex. An immersive, language-based mental imagery paradigm was used to test this hypothesis (e.g., 
imagine your heart pounding during a roller coaster ride, your face drenched in sweat during a 
workout). During two neuroimaging experiments, participants listened to vividly described situations 
and imagined “being there” in each scenario. In Study 1, we observed significantly heightened activity 
in primary interoceptive cortex (of dorsal posterior insula) during imagined experiences involving 
vivid internal sensations. This effect was specific to interoceptive simulation: it was not observed 
during a separate affect focus condition in Study 1, nor during an independent Study 2 that did not 
involve detailed simulation of internal sensations (instead involving simulation of other sensory 
experiences). These findings underscore the large-scale predictive architecture of the brain and reveal 
that words can be powerful drivers of bodily experiences.  
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INTEROCEPTIVE SIMULATION  3 
Imagine gazing down the dramatic slope of a seaside cliff as cool blasts of invigoratingly salty 
air whip across your face. Words come alive when they appeal to the senses and neuroscience is 
revealing why. Studies of the classic exteroceptive sensory systems (e.g., vision, touch, smell, etc.) 
consistently show that vividly imagining a sensory experience implements a pattern of neural activity 
in the corresponding primary sensory cortex (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; McNorgan, 2012). 
These findings demonstrate that top-down simulations penetrate into the primary sensory cortices. One 
sensory system is noticeably absent in this literature, however: interoception. Interoception refers to 
sensing the physiological condition of the body; primary interoceptive cortex in dorsal posterior insula 
receives sensory input from body’s internal milieu (Craig, 2002; Nieuwenhuys, 2012). Here we present 
evidence that the interoceptive system functions analogously to the exteroceptive systems: simulating 
internal bodily sensations during a vividly imagined experience implements a pattern of neural activity 
in primary interoceptive cortex. Return to the wildly windy cliff for a moment, and imagine that a 
sudden and gripping chill ripples through your body. You shiver. Your stomach tightens. Your breath 
quickens. In this study, we examined how words construct bodily experiences through simulation. 
Recent theoretical advances propose that conceptually driven, top-down processing occurs in 
the brain’s interoceptive system because interoceptive functioning is grounded in general principles 
that apply across sensory systems (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Chanes & Barrett, 2016; Farb et al., 
2015; Kleckner et al., 2017; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 2015; Seth, 2013; Seth & Friston, 2016). The 
Embodied Predictive Interoceptive Coding (EPIC) model, in particular, specifies a neuroanatomical, 
computational framework in which top-down simulations of bodily sensations are represented 
throughout the interoceptive system, including in primary interoceptive cortex (Barrett, 2017; Barrett 
& Simmons, 2015; Chanes & Barrett, 2016). In the same way that the sensory details of exteroceptive 
simulations are implemented in the primary sensory cortices (McNorgan, 2012), such as implementing 
simulations of visual details in primary visual cortex, we hypothesized that the details of interoceptive 
simulations are implemented in primary interoceptive cortex. Previous research suggests that precise, 
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INTEROCEPTIVE SIMULATION  4 
fine-grained simulations are associated with activity in the corresponding primary sensory cortex 
(Bergmann, Genc, Kohler, Singer, & Pearson, 2016; Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003). 
Specifically, we hypothesized that simulating internal bodily sensations within real-world 
scenarios, foregrounding situation-specific, fine-grained sensory details (e.g., imagining your heart 
pounding during a roller coaster ride, sweat dripping from your face during a workout), would be 
associated with increased neural activity in primary interoceptive cortex of dorsal posterior insula. 
Immersive mental imagery guided by precise language is an ideal paradigm for examining top-down 
interoceptive simulation in the brain, and, more generally, the neural correlates of a capacity that is 
central to human experience. Projecting oneself into a different situation, referred to here as scenario 
immersion, is involved in preparing for the future, reliving the past, taking another’s perspective, or 
simply escaping the present (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009; Pearson, Naselaris, 
Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015).  
We investigated the interoceptive simulation hypothesis through archival analyses of two 
published neuroimaging experiments (Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013a; Wilson-
Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011). Both studies involved a scenario immersion 
procedure designed to maximize ecological validity: participants listened with eyes closed to scenarios 
rich in multimodal sensory details and imagined “being there” in each scenario as if it was actually 
happening to them. A comprehensive analysis approach across the two studies supported testing the 
interoceptive simulation hypothesis, which included within-subjects and between-subjects statistical 
tests. In Study 1, scenario immersion foregrounded bodily sensations and thus provided a key test of 
the hypothesis that top-down interoceptive simulation is associated with heightened activity in primary 
interoceptive cortex. Further analyses examined specificity. Study 1’s design provided an active 
comparison condition for within-subjects analysis. On most trials in Study 1, scenario immersion was 
followed by a subsequent affect focus phase in which participants focused on affective feelings 
emerging in the scenario. Analogous to the literature demonstrating that precise, fine-grained visual 
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INTEROCEPTIVE SIMULATION  5 
simulations are associated with activity in primary visual cortex (Bergmann et al., 2016; Kosslyn & 
Thompson, 2003), we hypothesized that activity in primary interoceptive cortex would be greater 
during scenario immersion involving fine-grained simulations of bodily sensations than during coarse-
grained affective focus, in which bodily sensations were experienced with less precision as affective 
feelings. Study 2 provided an additional, between-subjects test of the interoceptive simulation 
hypothesis. In Study 2, scenario immersion did not involve fine-grained simulation of internal 
sensations (instead foregrounding other sensory details) and thus offered a further test of whether 
heightened primary interoceptive cortex activity during Study 1 scenario immersion was specific to 
interoceptive simulation.  
Methods 
Because comprehensive design details are available for Study 1 (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 
2013a) and Study 2 (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011) in published articles that examine different 
hypotheses, we focus on the methods and analysis approach that address the novel hypotheses 
presented here.   
Participants 
Native English speakers with no history of psychiatric illness comprised both samples. Study 1 
participants (N = 16, 8 female) ranged in age from 19-30 and Study 2 participants (N = 20, 10 female) 
ranged in age from 20-33. 
Procedural Overview 
Both studies induced affective feelings through immersion in scenarios depicting real-world 
experiences. An initial training session occurred 24-48 hours before a second refresher session, which 
occurred just prior to the scan session. Full paragraph-long forms of each scenario provided a richly 
detailed immersion experience during the training sessions. A corresponding shorter, core form of each 
scenario served to minimize presentation time in the scanner so the number of trials necessary for a 
powerful design could be implemented. During the first training session, participants practiced 
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INTEROCEPTIVE SIMULATION  6 
immersing in full versions of the scenarios and reinstating imagined details from the full versions upon 
immersing in the core forms (see Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013a; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011 for 
details). In the second refresher session occurring just prior to imaging, participants immersed in the 
full versions again to ensure they were reacquainted with scenario details before the scan session in 
which the core forms were presented.  
Scenario Stimuli 
Because Study 1 and Study 2 scenarios were initially developed for two different studies that 
tested unique hypotheses (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013a; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011), we 
computed an objective measure of interoceptive content, which is the between-subjects manipulation 
of interest here. We expected that automated text analysis would show that Study 1 scenarios contained 
more interoceptive content than Study 2 scenarios. After describing the construction and content of the 
scenarios, we present the results of this analysis.  
In both studies, scenario templates defined a standard sentence structure and specified general 
content, with the specific situational details varying across scenarios. Table 1 provides example 
scenarios and the scenario templates are available in the Appendix. The scenarios in both studies were 
second-person narratives designed to induce an affective experience (e.g., you feel… you’re… etc). 
Participants listened to the audio recordings of the scenarios with eyes closed to facilitate immersion. 
In both studies, scenario templates specified an affective event and provided sensory details that 
elaborated the event (see Table 1 and Appendix). 
Study 1 scenarios were designed to induce multisensory affective experiences. Each scenario 
was five sentences long, with one sentence focused exclusively on describing bodily changes. This 
sentence referred to sensory changes occurring in the body during the affect-inducing event (e.g., your 
heart is pounding, you take a deep breath, sweat drips off your face, your muscles unwind and loosen). 
The specific interoceptive details are provided in the Appendix. Further, an internal orientation to body 
and mind was present throughout the scenario. Each scenario opened by describing the state of the 
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INTEROCEPTIVE SIMULATION  7 
body, elaborated the affective feelings generated by a key event, and closed by describing the 
experience as a particular emotion. The scenarios varied in emotional valence and arousal to test an 
initial hypothesis (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013a). This design was advantageous here because it 
induced immersive, contextually-grounded interoceptive imagery and thus provided repeated sampling 
of interoceptive simulation in the scenarios. 
 Study 2 scenarios were similarly designed to induce multisensory affective experiences. Each 
scenario was six sentences long, and in contrast to Study 1 scenarios, were primarily externally 
focused. Scenarios opened with a focus on the setting and activity, and subsequently moved into 
elaboration of a visual or auditory detail. The description of the affective event focused on action and 
the consequence of that action. In some cases, the scenario ended with a brief bodily detail, but as the 
objective measure described next indicates, this was minor in comparison to Study 1. Because the first 
hypothesis examined with this study investigated situational context, the scenario events were either a 
physical danger or social evaluation theme (Table 1 provides an example of each theme) (Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011). 
Differences between the language-based scenarios in the two studies were quantified using an 
objective measure generated by the text analysis software LIWC (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). 
LIWC calculates the proportion of words in a text sample that fall in a content category, which is 
defined by a list of words. We created two new LIWC categories, Internal Body and Body Parts, by 
selecting words from the existing (and broad) LIWC categories Affect, Bio, Body, and Health. 
Neuroanatomical descriptions of the interoception system (Craig, 2002; Nieuwenhuys, 2012) guided 
construction of the Internal Body category. The 208 words in this category referred to the 
physiological condition of the body and included somatovisceral sensations (e.g., hunger, breath), pain 
(e.g., headache, cramp), somatic symptoms (e.g., cough, fever), and internal organs, glands, and 
muscles (e.g., stomach, heart). An additional 15 words (7% of total) were added from other sources 
(e.g., gas, palpitate), including the Body Sensations Questionnaire (Chambless, Caputo, Bright, & 
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INTEROCEPTIVE SIMULATION  8 
Gallagher, 1984), Body Vigilance Scale (Schmidt, Lerew, & Trakowski, 1997), and Patient Health 
Questionnaire-15 (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2002). Body Parts provided a contrasting “body” 
category that included 107 words referring to different parts of the body (e.g., arm, hip).  
The proportions of Internal Body and Body Part words in the scenarios from Study 1 (N = 90) 
and Study 2 (N = 60) deviated significantly from a normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p < .05) 
and could not be corrected with outlier removal or log transform (Supplementary Figure 5). Thus we 
transformed the data to ranks and conducted nonparametric Mann-Whitney U tests. As expected, Study 
1 scenarios contained a significantly higher proportion of internal body words than Study 2 scenarios 
(U = 2012, n1 = 90, n2 = 60, z =  -2.66, p = .01). The difference was specific to words describing 
internal sensations; the proportion of general body part words (e.g., arm, leg, etc.) did not differ in the 
two studies (U = 2696, z = -.02, p = .99). We display these results using means and standard errors in 
Figure 3b, alongside the corresponding imaging results, because these descriptive statistics offered a 
scale that is readily interpretable while still reflecting the pattern in the transformed rank data. 
Image Acquisition and Preprocessing 
The functional run scan sequences were identical in the two studies, with the exception of the 
head coil (Siemens 32-channel head coil used in Study 1 vs. Siemens 12-channel head coil used in 
Study 2). T2*-weighted echo planar image volumes depicting BOLD contrast were collected using 
parallel imaging with an iPAT acceleration factor of 2 (2 mm axial slices, TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms, 
flip angle = 90°, bandwidth = 2442 Hz/Px, FOV = 220 mm, matrix = 64, voxel size = 3.44 mm × 
3.44 mm × 2 mm). Because the head coils differed, we examined temporal signal-to-noise ratio 
(TSNR) in the two studies. A TSNR of 40 is recommended to reliably detect effects between 
conditions in fMRI data (Murphy, Bodurka, & Bandettini, 2007; Simmons, Reddish, Bellgowan, & 
Martin, 2010). Average TSNR in Study 1 and Study 2 surpassed this threshold in the posterior insula 
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INTEROCEPTIVE SIMULATION  9 
regions-of-interest (ROIs) used to test key hypotheses (details of the 6mm radius spherical ROIs are 
presented later in the analysis section; right sphere center 36 -32 16, left sphere center -34 -20 18). 
In both studies, standard preprocessing conducted in AFNI included slice time correction, 
motion correction, spatial smoothing (6mm FWHM Gaussian kernel), and percent signal change 
normalization of each run (in which signal intensities in each volume were divided by the mean signal 
value for the respective run and multiplied by 100) (Cox, 1996). We adjusted the previously reported 
preprocessing in minor ways to facilitate localization in the insula. First-level regression was computed 
in native space instead of template space so that we could display individual examples of insula 
activity (as shown in Figure 2). As reported previously, canonical Gamma functions convolved with 
boxcars reflecting event duration were used to model the hemodynamic response and six regressors 
obtained from motion correction during preprocessing were included to remove any residual signal 
changes correlated with movement (modeling specifics for each study are described in the next 
sections). The resulting regression coefficients were then warped to MNI space (instead of Talairach) 
using the MNI152 T1-weighted template prior to group analyses. This procedure facilitated later ROI 
analyses involving MNI coordinates reported in previous studies.  
Study 1 Neuroimaging Design & Analysis 
In Study 1, participants immersed in a scenario for 9 s, and then, on most trials, subsequently 
focused on and rated the induced feeling during a 6-s affect focus event. Unpredictable trials in which 
participants immersed in a scenario, but did not engage in subsequent affect focus, were included so 
neural activity during scenario immersion could be modeled separately from neural activity during 
affect focus. These partial “catch” trials accounted for 20% of the 180 total trials (Ollinger, Corbetta, 
& Shulman, 2001; Ollinger, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2001). Each of six runs consisted of one block of 
trials in which participants rated arousal during affect focus and one block of trials in which 
participants rated valence during affect focus (block order counterbalanced across runs; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2013a). During each block, 12 complete trials and 3 partial trials were presented in 
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an optimized pseudo-random order amidst jittered resting baseline periods (ranging from 3-15 s in 
increments of 3 s).   
In individual-level regression analyses, onset times were specified for the scenario immersion 
events, affect focus events, and the cues beginning blocks. Scenario immersion and affect focus events 
in arousal blocks were modeled separately from scenario immersion and affect focus events in valence 
blocks. Because arousal ratings emphasize the body and because the same scenarios were presented in 
arousal and valence blocks (with only subsequent affect focus differing), the analyses described below 
were conducted on arousal blocks. Supplementary Figure 6 illustrates that the same robust pattern of 
results emerged in valence blocks. 
Group-level analyses were conducted, first, to examine the hypothesis that top-down 
interoceptive simulation during scenario immersion foregrounding bodily sensations is associated with 
heightened activity in posterior insula. Each individual’s regression coefficients were entered into 
group-level analyses conducted within bilateral anatomical masks of the insula (using Eickhoff-Zilles 
macro labels available in AFNI)(Cox, 1996; Eickhoff et al., 2005). One-sample t tests examined if 
scenario immersion differed significantly from the resting baseline using a voxel-wise threshold of p 
< .001. Correction for multiple comparisons within the insula masks was implemented using a 
corrected p < .05 extent threshold of 135 mm
3
. AFNI ClustSim’s modified procedures address recent 
criticisms of extent thresholding (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016) by estimating noise smoothness 
using a spatial autocorrelation function that is fit to a mixed model (Guassian + mono-exponential) 
instead of a pure Gaussian.  
To precisely localize primary interoceptive cortex in further analyses, two spheres of 6 mm 
radius were constructed in dorsal posterior insula from MNI coordinates reported in independent 
datasets that involved manipulating interoceptive sensation. Coordinates for the sphere in right dorsal 
posterior insula (36 -32 16) were drawn from meta-analytic results demonstrating that interoceptive 
activity in posterior insula was consistently associated with stressor-evoked blood pressure reactivity 
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(Gianaros & Sheu, 2009). Coordinates for the sphere in left dorsal posterior insula (-34 -20 18) were 
drawn from a rigorous study that demonstrated, using arterial spin-labeling quantitative perfusion 
imaging, that interoceptive activity in left dorsal posterior insula tracks with pain intensity (Segerdahl, 
Mezue, Okell, Farrar, & Tracey, 2015). We chose to use these coordinates, specifically, because of the 
lack of available meta-analyses that precisely examine interceptive activity. A recent meta-analysis that 
examined interoception more broadly, including attention and awareness paradigms (e.g., listening to 
one’s own heartbeat), identified activity in central mid-insula, but not dorsal posterior insula (Kurth, 
Zilles, Fox, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010).  
We conducted three statistical tests in these regions of interest (ROIs) to investigate our a priori 
hypotheses, implementing a bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (resulting in a corrected p 
< .01 threshold). Examination of the distributions of data in each ROI revealed that the distribution of 
Study 1 scenario immersion coefficients exhibited moderate skew in the right dorsal posterior insula 
ROI (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p <  .05). To exercise a conservative approach, we also computed the 
equivalent nonparametric tests for the right ROI. Because the nonparametric tests yielded the same 
statistical conclusions as the parametric tests in this ROI, we present the results of the nonparametric 
analyses in a footnote in the results section.  
The first statistical test replicated the mask analyses within each ROI. We computed one-
sample, one-tailed t tests to examine if scenario immersion was significantly greater than resting 
baseline. The mean of each individual’s voxel-wise regression coefficients in the sphere was entered 
into the t test. The more conservative, nonparametric one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was also 
computed for the right ROI. 
In a first test of functional specificity (and a second statistical test), we capitalized on the catch 
trial design to compare scenario immersion and affect focus. This contrast allowed us to test the 
hypothesis that significantly greater activity in primary interoceptive cortex would be observed during 
scenario immersion involving precise, higher dimensional simulations of bodily sensations than during 
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affect focus involving less precise, lower dimensional experiences of bodily sensations. Paired-samples, 
one-tailed t tests examined if scenario immersion was significantly greater than affect focus in the two 
independent regions of interest. The more conservative, nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test was 
also computed for the right ROI. 
Study 2 Neuroimaging Design & Analysis 
Study 2 provided a second crucial test of specificity because, in this study, scenario immersion 
did not involve detailed simulation of internal bodily sensations. In this study design, participants 
immersed in a 9-s social evaluation or physical danger scenario and then, on most trials, subsequently 
heard one of four possible word cues during a 3-s event. Each word cue evoked a specific experience 
within the immersive scenario (e.g., threat-focused fear vs. sensory-focused observation). 
Unpredictable scenario-only trials were also included in this study, with these partial trials accounting 
for 33% of the 360 total trials (Ollinger, Corbetta, et al., 2001; Ollinger, Shulman, et al., 2001). During 
each of 10 runs, 24 complete trials and 12 partial trials were presented in an optimized pseudo-random 
order amidst jittered baseline periods (ranging from 0-12 s in increments of 3 s).  
Individual-level regression analyses specified onset times for the 9-s social evaluation and 
physical danger scenario immersion events. The onset times of the 3-s cued experience events that 
followed scenario immersion were also specified (as in Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011), but were not 
examined in any later analyses.  
At the group level, we conducted independent, one-tailed t tests in the two dorsal posterior 
insula ROIs to examine our a priori hypothesis that neural activity during Study 1 scenario immersion 
would be significantly greater than neural activity during Study 2 scenario immersion, which did not 
involve detailed simulation of internal sensations. In these tests, we compared Study 1 scenario 
immersion to the average of the two Study 2 scenario immersion conditions.
1
 Equal variances were not 
                                                        
1 We confirmed in further analyses that the results were consistent across both Study 2 scenario immersion 
conditions. Study 1 scenario immersion showed significantly greater activity than Study 2 scenario immersion 
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assumed due to significant Levene’s tests (p < .05), and the Cohen’s d effect sizes reported are 
corrected for groups with different sample sizes (dCohen). The more conservative, nonparametric Mann-
Whitney U test was also computed for the right ROI (due to moderate skew in the Study 1 scenario 
immersion distribution described above).  
Parallel to Study 1 analyses, we also conducted an analysis within the bilateral anatomical 
mask of the insula to examine the possibility that activity in mid-to-posterior insula would be observed 
outside of the spherical ROIs. One-sample t tests examined if scenario immersion differed significantly 
from baseline in the insula (voxel-wise threshold p < .001, corrected p < .05 cluster threshold 135 
mm
3
).  
General Whole-brain Approach 
Whole-brain analyses of scenario immersion (vs. resting baseline) in both studies were 
conducted in a grey matter mask of the MNI template. We corrected for multiple comparisons using a 
false discovery rate (FDR) q < .05 (corrected voxel-wise threshold p < .05, 20 contiguous voxels).  
Results 
Heightened neural activity in primary visual, somatosensory, and motor cortices during 
scenario immersion in both studies replicated prior simulation research (McNorgan, 2012) and 
established the validity of the paradigm (see also Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013b). 
Figure 1 illustrates this robust, multimodal neural activity in the whole-brain patterns observed in 
Study 1 and Study 2 (scenario immersion > resting baseline, corrected p < .05). 
Study 1 provided the first key test of our hypothesis. Scenario immersion in Study 1 
foregrounded the internal bodily changes occurring during the scenario (e.g., stomach queasiness, deep 
breathing, thumping heart, sweaty palms, relaxing muscles) (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013a). Figure 
2 illustrates that, as predicted, significantly heightened activity in bilateral, dorsal posterior insula 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
involving social evaluation and Study 2 scenario immersion involving physical danger (all tests p ≤ .001, 
significant correcting for multiple comparisons).  
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occurred during simulations of internal sensations (scenario immersion > resting baseline, voxel-wise 
threshold t(15) > 4.05, p < .001, corrected p < .05 cluster threshold 135 mm
3
). ROI analyses localized 
this activity in primary interoceptive cortex (Craig, 2002; Nieuwenhuys, 2012). Dorsal posterior insula 
activity during scenario immersion was significantly greater than resting baseline in the spherical ROIs 
generated from prior studies investigating interoceptive sensation: (1) ROI based on blood pressure 
reactivity (t(15) = 4.30, p = .001, d = 1.08)
2a
 (Gianaros & Sheu, 2009) and (2) ROI based on thermal 
pain (t(15) = 5.38, p < .001, d = 1.35) (Segerdahl et al., 2015).  
Further support for our hypothesis was evident in tests of specificity. Studies of exteroceptive 
simulation demonstrate that details matter: significant increases in primary visual cortex activity, for 
example, only occur during simulations rich in visual detail (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). A parallel 
hypothesis was that activity in primary interoceptive cortex would occur during precise, higher 
dimensional simulations of bodily sensations and would decrease substantially when bodily sensations 
are experienced as less precise, lower dimensional affective feelings. Study 1’s design offered a clear 
test of this hypothesis. After immersing in scenarios rich in interoceptive detail, participants then 
focused on affective feelings of arousal induced by the scenario. As predicted, Figure 3a illustrates that 
dorsal posterior insula activity in the independent ROIs was significantly greater during scenario 
immersion than during subsequent affect focus (Right, t(15) = 3.07, p = .004, d =  .77,
2b
; Left, t(15) = 
2.62, p = .009, d = .66). 
We conducted a second test of specificity in the independent ROIs to examine the hypothesis 
that the heightened dorsal posterior insula activity observed during Study 1 scenario immersion would 
not be observed in a second, independent study in which scenario immersion did not involve detailed 
simulation of internal sensations (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). As described in the methods, an 
                                                        
2
 Given the moderate skew in this ROI, we computed the equivalent nonparametric test for each contrast, which 
showed consistent results: 2a) significant difference observed in one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test (W = 
136, p < .001); 2b) significant difference observed in a Wilcoxon signed ranks test (z = -.2.66, p = .008); 2c) 
significant difference observed in a Mann-Whitney test (U = 10.5, z = -4.76, p < .001). 
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objective measure of interoceptive content verified that Study 1 scenarios contained a significantly 
higher proportion of internal body words than Study 2 scenarios (see upper panel of Figure 3b). Figure 
3b illustrates, as predicted, that activity in the independent dorsal posterior insula ROIs was 
significantly higher during Study 1 scenario immersion (Right, t(16) = 4.41, p < .001, dcohen =  1.65, 
2c
; 
Left, t(23) = 4.94, p < .001, dcohen = 1.76). In Study 2, neural activity during scenario immersion did 
not differ from within-study baseline resting activity anywhere in the posterior extent of the insula 
(voxel-wise threshold t(19) > 3.86, p < .001, corrected p < .05 cluster threshold 135 mm
3
).  
Finally, whole-brain analyses provided further evidence of interoceptive simulation. Figure 4 
illustrates that top-down simulation of internal sensations reaches deep into subcortical regions of the 
brain involved in visceromotor regulation (Bar et al., 2016). Significant increases in activity during 
Study 1 scenario immersion (vs. baseline) occurred in posterolateral thalamus and throughout the 
brainstem, including the periaqueductal gray (t(15) > 2.13, p < .05 FDR corrected). Heightened activity 
in these regions was not observed during Study 2 scenario immersion (t(19) > 2.09, p < .05 FDR 
corrected).  
Discussion 
To our knowledge, these studies provide the first evidence that top-down simulations of 
internal sensations are represented in primary interoceptive cortex. These findings parallel simulation 
effects observed across the primary sensory cortices of the exteroceptive sensory systems (McNorgan, 
2012). Planned analyses across two studies demonstrated the specificity of this result, which was not 
observed during general affective focus (within-subjects results from Study 1), nor during guided 
immersion that did not involve vivid bodily sensations (between-subjects results comparing Study 1 
and Study 2). Whole-brain analyses revealing subcortical activity in regions involved in visceromotor 
regulation provided further support that immersion involving bodily changes engages the interoceptive 
system. 
Simulation in the Interoceptive Sensory Domain 
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Our results add to accumulating evidence that top-down simulation functions similarly across 
the different sensory systems, including the interoceptive system. A recent meta-analysis examined 
imagery in each of the exteroceptive sensory systems (visual, auditory, somatosensory, gustatory, 
olfactory) and reported evidence of modality-specific neural activity that typically included the 
corresponding primary sensory cortex (McNorgan, 2012). Using a multimodal immersion paradigm, 
the results presented here replicated these findings (in the visual and somatosensory domains) and 
extended them to the interoceptive domain. Over the past decade, rigorous neuroanatomical and 
neuroimaging studies have characterized a coordinated interoceptive system involved in sensing the 
physiological condition of the body (Craig, 2002, 2003; Nieuwenhuys, 2012; Stephani, Vaca, 
Maciunas, Koubeissi, & Lüders, 2011). Our findings highlight that constructing bodily experiences 
during top-down simulation involves this same system, including primary interoceptive cortex. 
Studies of visual imagery suggest that primary visual cortex (V1) is implicated when imagery 
involves high-resolution visualization of the details, parallel to V1’s function during perception 
(Bergmann et al., 2016; Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). A review of studies investigating visual imagery 
studies revealed that simulating visual detail with high resolution was the strongest predictor of early 
visual cortex activity (Brodmann Areas 17 or 18) (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). Furthermore, a recent 
individual differences study showed that greater visual imagery precision was associated with greater 
V1 surface area and V1 cortical thickness (but not V2 anatomy) (Bergmann et al., 2016). Our findings 
suggest parallel functionality in the interoception system. The dorsal posterior, granular portion of the 
insula is considered primary sensory cortex based on pathways of sensory input from the body, 
analogous to other primary sensory cortices (e.g., V1) (Craig, 2002). A within-subjects analysis 
revealed greater activity in this region during highly precise scenario immersion than during the less 
precise affect focus, both of which occurred in the context of an imagined scenario.  
Because this study included a variety of internal bodily sensations in compelling real-world 
contexts, and employed language to evoke fine-grained sensory details, the experimental design 
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provided a strong test of interoceptive simulation. In contrast to the current study, activity in primary 
interoceptive cortex has not been observed in a handful of studies that examined simulation of physical 
pain, a sensory experience that involves interoception (Drabant et al., 2011; Fairhurst, Fairhurst, Berna, 
& Tracey, 2012; Koyama, McHaffie, Laurienti, & Coghill, 2005; Meyer, Williams, & Eisenberger, 
2015; Ogino et al., 2007). Pain is a complex subjective experience that often involves distributed 
activity in the somatosensory and interoceptive systems, as well as other cortical and subcortical 
systems (e.g., Bingel et al., 2003; Hayes & Northoff, 2012; Wager et al., 2013). The aforementioned 
studies in which participants simulated pain in imagined or remembered contexts consistently observed 
neural activity in the somatosensory cortices, providing evidence of tactile simulation (but not 
interoceptive simulation). Interestingly, in a study in which participants were prompted to relive a 
physical pain memory, the authors noted that none of the participants reported re-experiencing the pain 
(i.e., having the experience of being in pain again) and 41% of the participants were unable to report 
the sensory quality of the pain (Meyer et al., 2015; Morley, 1993). Thus it appears that activity in 
primary interoceptive cortex may not have been observed in these studies because it is difficult to 
simulate the aversive sensory details of physical pain (which is not entirely surprising given that 
people are typically not motivated to relive or imagine these experiences). 
Top-down Coordination in the Interoceptive System 
Accumulating evidence that simulations of sensory experiences are represented in the primary 
sensory cortices is consistent with emerging views of the brain’s large-scale predictive architecture 
(Barrett, 2017; Bastos et al., 2012; Chanes & Barrett, 2016; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Lochmann & 
Deneve, 2011). The results presented here support hypotheses derived from a recent account of 
interoceptive simulation, the Embodied Predictive Interoceptive Coding (EPIC) model (Barrett & 
Simmons, 2015). EPIC provides a new framework for investigating interoceptive functioning in the 
brain across micro-to-macro scales, including the systems neuroscience that is typical of fMRI studies 
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(for an extension of the EPIC framework, see Barrett, 2017; Chanes & Barrett, 2016; and for other 
discussions of interoceptive prediction, see Pezzulo et al., 2015; Seth, 2013; Seth & Friston, 2016).  
Mental imagery is an ideal fMRI paradigm for investigating top-down prediction and is used 
extensively to study exteroceptive simulation (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009). The EPIC framework draws 
attention to the comparatively little work investigating simulation of internal bodily states. EPIC is 
based on converging evidence of neural pathways through which top-down simulations impact activity 
in primary interoceptive cortex and thus represents a departure from traditional bottom-up models of 
interoception (Barrett, 2017; Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Chanes & Barrett, 2016). Consistent with this 
account, we observed activity in primary interoceptive cortex and throughout the brainstem during 
interoceptive simulation initiated by language (in the imagery-based scenario immersion paradigm).  
These results complement recent investigations of the distributed, large-scale brain system that 
emerges in the EPIC framework. Building on advances in the network dynamics of the insula and 
cingulate cortices (Cauda et al., 2012; Cauda et al., 2011; Deen, Pitskel, & Pelphrey, 2011; Seeley et 
al., 2007; Touroutoglou, Hollenbeck, Dickerson, & Feldman Barrett, 2012), a recent synthesis defined 
a coordinated, distributed interoceptive/allostatic system, drawing on tract-tracing studies in macaque 
monkeys and using functional connectivity techniques in humans, and then demonstrated the 
behavioral relevance of this system (Kleckner et al., 2017). Individuals with increased intrinsic 
connectivity in this system also displayed increased interoceptive sensitivity, which was measured as 
the concordance between objective bodily changes during an affective task and subjective reports of 
corresponding feelings. 
The findings reported here, taken together with neuroanatomical and functional connectivity 
evidence, suggest that EPIC warrants further empirical attention. In this model, simulation occurs 
during interoceptive functioning generally (not just during immersive imagery). Interoceptive 
simulation underlies anticipating changes in the body’s internal milieu and preparing to meet those 
needs before they arise (Barrett, 2017; Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Chanes & Barrett, 2016). This 
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allostatic process of achieving stability through change is the most efficient means of keeping the 
body’s many physiological systems in balance (McEwen, 1998; McEwen & Wingfield, 2003; Sterling, 
2012; Sterling & Eyer, 1988). The brain coordinates this functioning by anticipating based on prior 
experiences, initiating top-down simulations that prepare the body for what might happen next, and 
then adjusting if necessary.
3
 In other words, simulation is integral not only to talking about and 
imagining sensory experiences “offline,” but also to constructing “online” experiences unfolding in the 
world (Wilson-Mendenhall, 2017). 
Clinical Implications of Interoceptive Simulation 
Our results make a unique contribution to recent discussions of how interoceptive simulation 
may impact mental health (e.g., Barrett, Quigley, & Hamilton, 2016; Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Khalsa 
& Lapidus, 2016). Mental imagery is an integral part of exposure and re-scripting techniques that are 
used in clinical settings, especially in treating anxiety and mood disorders (Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, & 
Holmes, 2016; Pearson et al., 2015). Imagery re-scripting, for example, is used to render aversive 
autobiographical images less unpleasant or emotional (Slofstra, Nauta, Holmes, & Bockting, 2016). 
Typical instructions are fairly abstract, without a high degree of sensory guidance (e.g., “keep the 
memory in mind and think of what you could say to yourself that would help or support you in the 
memory and say that in your memory”). Recent findings suggest that adjusting imagined perceptual 
features (e.g., colors, object positions) contributes to re-scripting (Slofstra et al., 2016). Neuroscience 
evidence suggests simulation of sensory details in corresponding primary sensory cortices reconstructs 
the memory (Pearson et al., 2015). This reconstructed experience is then available in memory and can 
be re-instantiated during future, related situations outside the clinical setting. A novel insight based on 
findings presented here is that targeting interoceptive sensory details, specifically, could produce an 
embodied re-scripting that contributes to allostatic balance in an individual’s everyday life. 
                                                        
3
 For neuroanatomical and circuitry details, see Kleckner et al. (2017), Chanes & Barrett (2016), and Barrett & 
Simmons (2015).  
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The importance of vivid sensory details during simulation gains further support from carefully 
controlled studies of episodic construction, which can be oriented in the past or the future. People who 
repeatedly imagined consuming a specific food, for example, subsequently consumed less of that food 
(than those who did not imagine consuming the food, imagined consuming it only a few times, or 
imagined consuming a different food) (Morewedge, Huh, & Vosgerau, 2010). Other empirically 
demonstrated outcomes of constructing vivid simulations include increasing prosocial intention 
(Gaesser & Schacter, 2014), reducing implicit racial bias (Lai et al., 2014), and improving problem-
solving related to worrisome future events (Jing, Madore, & Schacter, 2016). Recent discussions 
highlight the level of detail as a key dimension through which imagined experiences positively impact 
well-being (Jing et al., 2016; Schacter, 2012). This view is consistent with neuroscience evidence 
presented here and elsewhere (e.g., Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003) that the sensory details of simulations 
guide implementation in primary sensory cortices.  
Limitations  
No study is without limitations. Our analysis approach included within- and between-subjects 
analyses. Because the between-subjects analyses we conducted reflect an archival analysis across two 
studies, the experimental conditions we examined were not fully randomized. Using two independent 
datasets allowed us to conduct a strong between-subjects test of our hypothesis (in which effects are 
typically harder to detect). It is possible, however, that differences in the samples, apparatus, or other 
random factor may have contributed to these effects. The objective measure of interoceptive content, 
replication of exteroceptive simulation effects in both studies, and the temporal signal-to-noise ratio in 
insular cortex, provide further support for the interpretations presented here. Future research might also 
consider using functional localizers to precisely map primary interoceptive cortex. This procedure 
introduces its own challenges, because localizers are more invasive in the interoceptive domain and 
therefore challenging to implement (including possible unpleasant affective consequences). Because 
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this was an archival analysis, we used coordinates from two independent studies that examined 
different sources of interoceptive input to localize primary interoceptive cortex.  
Conclusion 
To our knowledge, these studies provide the first evidence that simulated internal sensations are 
represented in primary interoceptive cortex. The findings are consistent with emerging models of the 
brain’s predictive architecture, including the interoceptive system. The implication: words might not 
break your bones like sticks and stones but they can indeed hurt (or help) you. 
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Table 1. Example Study 1 and Study 2 scenarios. Italics in Study 1 indicate focal interoceptive detail. 
 
Study 1  Study 2 
 
You are sitting home alone reading, 
immersed in a dramatic murder mystery. 
You startle violently when you hear the 
piercing sound of glass breaking. 
Launching out of your chair, your heart 
is palpitating wildly in your chest. Your 
mind harbors terrible visions of your 
assailant as you grab for the phone. 
Your feel a striking fear. 
 
  
You’re jogging along an isolated lake at 
dusk. Thick dark woods surround you as 
you move along the main well-marked 
trail. On a whim, you veer onto an 
overgrown unmarked trail. You become 
lost in the dark. The trees close in 
around you, and you cannot see the sky. 
You feel your pace quicken as you try to 
run out of the darkness. 
 
You are playing outside with your 
nephew, running around tirelessly. You 
rake up a leaf pile and then take turns 
jumping in the heap. You find yourself 
quickly out of breath from jumping and 
laughing. You rapidly forget about 
being a grown-up and surrender to 
youthful fun. You feel an enlivening 
happiness.  
 
You’re at a dinner party with friends. A 
debate about a contentious issue arises 
that gets everyone at the table talking. 
You alone bravely defend the unpopular 
view. Your comments are met with 
sudden uncomfortable silence. Your 
friends are looking down at their plates, 
avoiding eye contact with you. Your feel 
you chest tighten. 
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Appendix 
 
Scenario Templates for Study 1 and Study 2 
 
Sentence Study 1 Study 2 (physical) Study 2 (social) 
1 
state of body and elaboration of 
activity and/or setting 
setting and activity, and 
any relevant personal 
attributes 
[same as physical] 
2 affective event setting: visual detail  setting: auditory detail  
3 affective event: arousal detail 
using physiological references  
affective event: action  [same as physical] 
4 affective event: valence detail 
using pleasant or unpleasant 
descriptors 
affective event: 
consequence of the 
action 
[same as physical] 
5 affective event: categorized the 
experience with the sentence 
“You feel a(n) [adjective] [fear, 
happiness, or sadness].”   
affective event: action in 
response to consequence 
affective event: another 
person’s action in 
response to the 
consequence  
6 
 
affective event: resulting 
somatosensory 
experience 
affective event: 
resulting bodily 
experience  
 
 
Study 1 Bodily Details 
(Sentence 3 designed to specify arousal)  
Affective Event Bodily Detail 
Ride rollercoaster 
Your heart is pounding and your stomach drops as crisp 
air blasts your face.  
Perform in play 
Your heart beats quickly as fresh energy pulses through 
you.  
Jump off seaside cliff 
Your stomach is whirling as you flail your arms and legs 
freely in the air.  
Start championship game 
You jump in place to shake off the restlessness in your 
stomach.  
Ditch work for road trip 
Jumping in your car, you stop for a brief moment to 
catch your breath.  
Slide down water slide The cool water washes over your tensed abdomen as you 
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slip and slide.  
Ski steep hill 
Before long you are working up a sweat, sticking to your 
warm clothing.  
Watch TV drama 
Settling under the covers, you curl up and wait for the 
drama to unfold.  
Imagine giving speech You lean back and close your eyes, inhaling a full breath.  
Meet significant other's parents 
You gently wave as they enter the restaurant and your 
shoulders naturally settle.  
Crush returns gaze 
Your crush looks away and you smile to yourself in the 
private moment.  
Make silly bet with friends 
You shift to lay your head on a pillow as your friend 
begins laying out rules.  
Notified of award nomination 
Giving into your body's desire to unwind, you relax your 
muscles, tilting your head back.  
Imagine new job night before start 
You stretch out and roll over, your body recovering a 
soothing alignment.  
Make impulsive online purchase 
Clicking to finalize the purchase, you exhale gradually 
with a bit of disbelief.  
React to car swerving into lane 
Your muscles instinctually tighten as you slam your foot 
on the brakes.  
Experience airplane trouble 
For a moment all that you sense is a shocking internal 
numbness.  
Witness shooting 
You quickly drop behind a car and attempt to control 
your shallow breathing.  
Stuck with broken down car in 
remote area 
Sweating profusely, you try repeatedly to start the 
exasperatingly unresponsive car.  
Realize intruder in house 
Launching out of your chair, you heart is palpitating 
wildly in your chest.  
Imagine painful medical procedure 
As he explains the details, you sense the queasiness in 
your stomach escalating.  
Learn tornado hit family's town 
Your stomach cinches in knots as you run outside to call 
your family.  
See snake poised to strike 
Gasping, your stomach tightens as you see a snake 
poised a foot from you.  
Wake up late 
You remain still, movement disagreeing with your worn 
out body.  
Read disturbing news story 
Your body sinks reading that the shooter was a troubled 
teen who killed himself.  
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Receive pressing e-mail from boss 
Taking a deep breath, you lengthen your spine in an 
attempt to reenergize.  
Learn flu spreading in office 
You sense yourself recoil slightly as you click to close 
out of your e-mail. 
Look for table to eat lunch 
In the silence, you sense your heart beating steadily as 
you look around at your peers.  
Volunteer to answer hard question 
in front of others 
Scanning the crowd, you hear yourself swallow and 
linger on the sensation in your throat.  
Await midterm grade You shift in your seat and yawn widely as you rub your 
eyes.  
Win lottery Your heart is pounding and your legs wobble as you 
fixate on the string of digits.  
Win special prize for submission Your heart begins pumping and your mouth drops open 
in shock.  
Perform successfully 
You bend at the waist into a deep bow and sense your 
heart thumping rapidly.  
Finish running race 
You are breathing heavily as your legs rhythmically 
begin to slow.  
Embrace warm family 
homecoming 
You grasp your siblings and parents tightly, inhaling 
deep into your belly.  
Play with family outside 
You find yourself quickly out of breath from jumping 
and laughing.  
Run into good friend unexpectedly 
You quickly turn around and your body elevates as you 
are met with a warm smile.  
Arrive for holiday with family 
Your stomach rumbles gently as the tautness in your 
chilled body subsides.  
Wake up to sweet note 
You unfold onto your back and stretch your limbs widely 
under the sheets.  
Take in beautiful nature scene 
Your breathing slows and softens as your eyes pour over 
the expansive vista.  
Lounge by the ocean 
In this moment, you experience your chest rising and 
falling softly.  
Cuddle with puppy 
As her small body relaxes, you sense both your hearts 
beating evenly.  
Read in hammock 
As you escape reality, you sense the weight of your body 
release into the hammock.  
Drink cool beverage on hot day 
As you yawn widely and deeply, you sense how dry your 
throat has become.  
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Float in lake 
Your eyes close softly as you center on the warming 
sensation of the rising sun.  
End suffering of pet 
A wave of nausea surfaces and you reach out to stabilize 
yourself.  
Win championship with injury 
You hear a pop and pant sharply as a throbbing pain 
erupts in your knee.  
Insult abrasive colleague 
Your stomach tightens the moment the last sarcastic jab 
escapes your lips.  
Pass big exam but friend did not 
You gasp in disbelief of the results and your friend 
swiftly turns away from you.  
Donate blood 
Squeezing a ball in your hand, you sense your stomach 
becoming unsettled.  
Receive comfort from friend 
You sense your stomach churning as you avert your 
watering eyes for a second. 
Witness near-miss injury of family 
member 
Your heart is racing and your hands clammy as you leap 
off your bike.  
Learn sibling moving across 
country 
You gasp loudly, slowing to a fast walk while failing to 
conceal your dumbfounded state.  
Finish exhausting workout 
A cramping ache in your left quad directs your attention 
to each small step.  
Receive undeserved praise 
Peering at your boss, you take a deep breath as you hear 
him continue on.  
Navigate bad weather to see friend 
Pulling on your jacket, you shudder slightly as you lift up 
your hood.  
Confess mistake to good friend 
As you express your regret, your heartbeat slows to a 
more natural speed.  
Receive good news that cannot 
share 
Wishing you could call him, you close your eyes and 
release a held breath.  
Host costly dinner for friends 
As you swipe your credit card, you can hear your heart 
beating in your chest.  
Escape awkward encounter 
Saying good-bye, your stomach flutters in the wake of 
the awkward interaction.  
Take new job that means leaving 
best friend 
You begin to sweat as you run up the stairs, hearing a 
faint cheer.  
Finish meaningful charity race 
Covered in sweat and heart pumping, you pick up your 
pace.  
Reminisce at graduation 
Following energetic classmates, you sweat lightly as you 
march away a graduate.  
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Celebrate sibling’s wedding 
You sense your heart pumping as you consciously slow 
your movements.  
Watch finale of favorite show 
Clapping your hands together, you gasp in unison with 
others at the plot twist.  
Lose round of playful game 
As you jump about gesturing vigorously, you sense your 
heart beating faster.  
Quit job with great co-workers 
Walking swiftly to your desk, disheartened coworkers 
gather around.  
Wrap final game with teammates 
Smiling as sweat drips off your face, your body is still 
energized.  
Immerse in nostalgic memories 
Closing your eyes, you sense the calm rhythm of your 
heart beating.  
Conclude joyful holiday 
Your eyes are heavy and begin to close as you exhale 
easily and softly.  
Start new life chapter 
You glance at the worn jeans on the floor and 
spontaneously hold in a breath.  
Let go of long, hard day 
You sense your stiff neck relax as you rest your head on 
a pillow.  
Miss spouse on fun trip 
Anticipating the warm Florida weather, you sense your 
heart beating softly.  
Give as gift something you want 
You detect your energy level shift ever so slightly as you 
hold the package.  
Hear song from youth 
In the moment following, you allow your eyes to close 
and release a breath.  
Receive school application 
rejection 
Your eyes swell and your body caves inward as hope 
morphs into devastation.  
Miss holiday with family 
Your body quivers and you fight back tears when the 
airport is officially closed.  
Hit dog with car 
Tears begin to swell as you leap out of the car as fast as 
you can.  
Learn significant other cheating  Your stomach is nauseated, the shocking infidelity 
settling into your body.  
Face credit card debt Your stomach becomes uneasy as you examine the 
accruing charges.  
Learn cancer has returned You bury your head in your hands, inhaling in short 
sharp breaths.  
Search for missing family member 
Your throat instantly goes dry when you think of the 
danger she might be facing.  
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Watch starving children ad 
As the commercial ends, you close your eyes and sense 
yourself exhale.  
Miss out on movie tickets 
Your body sinks as you scan the other lackluster 
possibilities on the board.  
Think about those less fortunate 
His presence remains with you as your muscles unwind 
and loosen.  
Wait for dinner when hungry 
Your stomach grumbles as you turn to relay the message 
to your friends.  
 Realize new recipe not very good 
Setting down your fork momentarily, you hear your 
stomach quietly rumbling.  
Fail to fix technical problem 
After another failed attempt, you slowly close your 
computer and let go of a breath.  
Discover pimple on face 
You stare at your face, motionless until a sigh escapes 
and your shoulders sink. 
Find photo of deceased grandparent 
You softly close your eyes, briefly tearing up as you hold 
the photograph.  
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Figure 1. Imagery-based simulation effects replicated across multiple exteroceptive modalities. Study 1 and 
Study 2 scenario immersion (vs. resting baseline) maps projected on inflated right hemisphere are shown in 
lateral and medial views. Scenario immersion > baseline in warm colors; scenario immersion < baseline in 
cool colors. Immersion during Study 2 social evaluation scenarios is shown for conciseness; a very similar 
pattern emerged across sensory and motor regions during Study 2 physical danger scenarios.  
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Figure 2. Dorsal posterior insula activity during Study 1 scenario immersion. A shows Group-level results 
shown in the right hemisphere and in representative axial (z = 6) and coronal (y = -14) slices (right cluster 
1630 mm3, center 41 -15 10; left cluster: 854 mm3, center -38 -19 11). Three examples at the individual 
level (scenario immersion > baseline, t > 1.96, p < .05) shown on each individual’s anatomy in the right 
hemisphere, within insula masks generated using Freesurfer’s cortical parcellation of each individual’s 
anatomy (Fischl et al., 2004). A cluster in left anterior insula also emerged in the group-level contrast, which 
can be seen on the axial slice (616 mm3, center -30 25 2). B displays the independent ROIs in primary 
interoceptive cortex that were generated from previous fMRI studies of interoception. The group-level 
results described in A replicated in these ROIs.  
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Figure 3. Specificity of dorsal posterior insula activity to interoceptive simulation. Neural activity in the left 
dorsal posterior insula ROI is displayed. The same pattern of results was observed in the right dorsal 
posterior insula ROI. Panel A contrasts Study 1 scenario immersion with Study 1 affect focus. The diagram 
on the upper left illustrates the within-subjects design that provided an active comparison condition – affect 
focus – for this contrast. The significantly greater activity during immersion in precise interoceptive detail vs. 
focus on affect with less interoceptive precision is illustrated below, with the asterisk labeled A. Panel B 
contrasts Study 1 scenario immersion with Study 2 scenario immersion. The graph on the upper right 
displays the results of the automated text analysis on the scenarios. Study 1 scenarios contained a 
significantly greater proportion of internal body words than Study 2 scenarios (but no difference in body part 
words). Means and standard errors are displayed because these descriptive statistics offer a scale that is 
readily interpretable while still reflecting the pattern in the transformed rank data of the nonparametric test 
(we also note that parametric tests in which two extreme values > 3 SDs were removed showed the same 
pattern of results as the nonparametric tests and because means are presented here, we removed these two 
outliers before visualizing). In the graph below, the asterisk labeled B illustrates the significantly greater 
activity during Study 1 scenario immersion vs. Study 2 scenario immersion. All asterisks are a symbol of p < 
.05.  
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Figure 4. Activity in subcortical regions involved in visceromotor regulation during Study 1 scenario 
immersion (vs. Study 2 scenario immersion). Scenario immersion > baseline in warm colors; scenario 
immersion < baseline in cool colors.  
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Supplementary Figure 5  
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Supplementary Figure 6  
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